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PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND INCENTIVE PROGRAMS:
REF1,ECTIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM
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1. INTRODUCTION
Government regulation of human activity affecting the environment,' may take an
infinite variety of forms ranging from direct state ownership of the means of production
to implicit state support of private ownership and exchange relations through private law.
Like that of most Western nations, Canadian environmental policy has traditionally choscn
a position well within these extremes employing simple "on/off' penal commands
regulating the production of atmospheric, land and water effluents. More recently,
regulatory policy has involved increased state expropriation of private property for public
conservation purposes, and more sophisticated incremental (albeit command) models of
regulation which link a range of penalties to increasingly harmful activities.
Not unexpectedly, the monitoring costs of command models of regulation, whether
focusing on effluent regulation, or on the existence of some deleterious impact on
environmental quality have proven to be substantial. As well, regulators have faced
significant political and economic costs when forced, by the regulatory model they have
chosen, lo initiate Draconian enforcement powers including plant closures and production
stoppages. As a result, environmental policy analysts have mandated performance and
design production processes through a complicated system of permits and licences. and
have developed a number of economic instruments including direct and indirect tax
subsidies for investment in pollution control technology, and tradeable pollution rights to
influence activity which affects the environment.'

'

The bmadcst dcfinition of the environmcnt which might be employed in discussing environmental
policy is "the aggregation of material (physical and biological) resources, and the processes through
which they are transformed." The definition which I employ is considerably narrower. It accepts, for
the purposes of current govcmment envimnmental policy. a homoccntric environmental ethic. The
definition of the environment employed in this paper is the "collection of physical and biological
resources currently available, whether transformed or capable of transformation, for human welfare."
The one "process" through which those resourccs are transformed which I ftxus on in this paper is
the market the institutinn through which resources arc crcated, transformed and distributed. It is
unnecessary, for our purposes, to define the ways in which human welfare might be improved
through the enjoyment of the resourccs, or their transformation.
This program is one, and perhaps the first, Canadian initiative which attempts to operaiionaliz~the
concept of "sustainable dcvelopment" aniculated in the United Nations World Commission on
Environment and Development published in 1987. The "Brundtland Repofl" entitled Our Common
Fulure ha< been the subject of some legitimate skeptical criticism focusing on our ability to link
economic and environmental choices, and on the assumption that development, rather than the
environment should be our policy objcctive. As well, one can imagine a number of ambiguous ideas
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Public bureaucrats, whatever their chosen regulatory instrumcnt, cannot, however,
operate in pristine isolation from other social institutions. In particular, regulators must
live out their lives within a legul environment over which they have little direct, shortterm influcnce. In Canada, as in many liberal democracies, legislators and regulators have
had to tailor "command" models of regulatory policy and implementation to a range of
constraints established by the judiciary. In particular, regulators have been directed by
courts to act "fairly" in their cxercise of state power over private interests. The
deployment of more sophisticated regulatory weapons has generated judicial action
designed in large part to continue this historical relationship with regulators."
In this paper I address the prescriptive4question which confronts bureaucrats designing
fiscal incentive programs and other non-command rnodels of environmental regulation:

How should the procedural context within which the government operates be
defined, when it rejects its more coercive regulatory weapons in favour of more
effective, but apparently less coercive, regulatory instruments?
Most legal analyses of "due process", procedural fairness; natural justice and rebated
concepts adopt a variant of either a rights based or a "justice as process" argumcnt in
order to justify the application of procedural fairness norms to the regulatory process. All
of these positions havc in common an implicit "anti-bureaucratic" bias procedural
fairness represents the deployment of judicial forces to control bureaucratic power, not
through definitions of statutory or constitutional authority or through the substitution of
judicial for bureaucraticjudgment, but through the development of allegedly neutral "fair"
processes.'

.
I
2

$

contained in the use of "sustai~iability".I t can refer to the sustained yield of natural rcsourccs; it can
refer to thc sustaining o f biodiversity in the environment; or i t might rcl'cr to the sustaining of' a
specific rate of dcvelopmcnt. See, Tor exumplc, "Brundtland message lacks economic base" The
/7brotrrc1/ Globe rrrtrl Mttil (14 June 1989) B2. Sec "Forni and Function" Wall Streel Journal (21
August 19%)) B I .
I discuss these dcvclopments in detail ill Part IV, bclow.
I admit that the descriptive cornpanion to my qucstion is cxtrctncly importitnt to regulators. Within
the lirst year of its operations the Environmcr~talChoice Board Faced a serious legal challenge 10 a
decision to recornlnend a wcycled paper product guideline. One o f the grounds o f thc challcnge was
that the Board had not employed prcwcdures which permitted affected pi~rticsthe opponunity to
participate effectively in the program. The very last thing which the Board, dcpilrtment:tl hurcaucrats,
and the Minister of the Environment needcd was a lawsuit, ultimittcly successful or not. The lawsuit
is politically embarrassing. rcdirects valuable program resourccs. and signals other afrectcd panics
of one more potentbl delaying strategy. As one burcnucret explained:
The Minister hits cxtremcly limited Irsourcrs. Accordingly, hc has two boxes
on his desk one containing "New lnitiativcs". the othcr "Prohlcms". As wc
both know, thc ECI' is no longer a New Initicttivc.
The most technical simply ask whether the bureaucratic decision appcilrs similar lo those tritdiliunally
made by judgeh. Thus paradiglnatic highly kxused lart-linding. and the ilpplication of prcdctcrmined
rulcs to those spccific facts have heen viewed as appropriate litr thc applicittion of processes utilized
by couns. Related ;slalyses li)cus on the kind o f order or rule which the bureaucrat is milking. If the
kind of' remedial authority and its l i ~ u sis close to that which courts would traditionally excrcisc,
court-like pl.occsses arc dcmandcd. A slightly more intercstitig analysis has enquired into the kind
of privitte intcrcst (wealth, personal liheriy, i ~ n dthe like), which i s being i~ffcctcdby the cxcrcisc of
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Slightly different arguments focus on the implicit normative considerations which
appear to influence judicial reasoning." More "principled" arguments posit that human
beings (and corporations?) should be treated with respect and dignity. Individuals affected
by bureaucratic choices should not be conceived as "means" to some greater utilitarian
end; and even if they are, they are also individuals whose welfare counts.'
The most recent Canadian development in this area has been the articulation of what
is known as the "reasonable expectation" d ~ c t r i n e .Although
~
the doctrine has generated
considerable academic debate, it is at best a modest expansion of the list of interests
employed in traditional "rights" based analyses beyond those recognized by courts in
common law adjudication."n theory, legitimate expectation analysis is applicable to the
Environmental Choice Program in virtually all of its decision-making processes."'

o"r

1

)

'"

bureaucratic power. The higher that interest ranks in the writer's list of human interests. the more
likely that process rights will be recommended. See, for example, Kane v. Board of Governors of the
University of British Coiumbia, ( 19801 1 S.C.R. 1105 (high standard of justice required when right
to continue employment is at stake).
example. as legitimate power over labour reliitions was shifted from the courts to administrative
agencies, with a concomitant shift in attitudes towards labour, one found, not surprisingly. that the
courts continued to insist upon procedural protection in the administrative process for the corporate
interests which could no longer be directly furthered in the judicial process.
Similarly, some have argued that notions of property as a concept which empowers individuals in
their relationships with each other and the community means, in the modern welfare state. that receipt
of government largesse ought to be afforded at least some of the traditional protection enjoyed by
property right holders.
See Old St Botti/ace Resident's A.ssociation Inc. v. Winnipeg, [I9901 3 S.C.R. 1170, Reference Re
Canada Assistance Plan, ( I W l ] 2 S.C.R. 525 (legitimate expectations doctrine does not apply to
decisions to introduce legislation in Parliament). See also Schmidt v. Secretaw of State for Home
Affairs, 119691 1 All E.R. 904 at 909. Commonwealth developments in the area arc canvassed in
R.E. Riggs. "Legitimate Expcctations and Procedural Fairness in English Law" (1988) 36 Amer. I.
of Comp. Law 400.
See Ng v. Attorney General of Hong Kong. (19841 2 All E.R. 346 per Lord Fraser at 350 who
criticized the view of Barwick J. in Sulemi v. MacKellur (No. 2) (1977), 137 C.L.R. 396; and Jim
Harris Ltd. v. Minister of Energy (1980). 2 N.Z.L.R. 294 at 296 (benefit or privilege imports the
concept of legitimate expectations).
One of the first legal opinions on procedural fairness received by the Board reflected this kind of
formal analysis. Thc writer simply said that the program was distributing a "privilege" to. rather than
affecting a "right" of the affected firm, and thus was under no obligation to provide tirms with the
opportunity to participate in decisions affecting their welfare. The problem with the analysis is that
whether some benefit "is" a right depends on whether we decide to link it to procedural safeguards.
In other words, if a court says that the program requires procedural fairness. then by definition, the
program benefits are "rights", albeit protected only by procedural due process. If a court says that
the program does not require procedural fairness, then, again by definition, the program benefits arc
not "rights".
Thesc processes are described in detail in Part Ill. Briefly. they include:
the choice of tentative product categories;
[he development of the substantive environmental criteria in specific cnvironmcntal
guidelines;
the development of the terms of the contract through which the right to use the logo is
regulated;
the consideration of applications for licenses;
the original decision to contract with a specific private sector company;
the issuilnce of a licence to use the ECOLOGO; and
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My thesis shares little in common with any of these traditional analyses. All of the
"rights" based justitlcations of judicial review justify procedural protection on
individualistic human rights grounds, or on utilitarian grounds which focus on the
production and aggregation of wealth by "private" actors. While my thesis is highly
utilitarian, I argue that procedural fairness in government incentive programs is required
to further public policy objectives." That is, environmental policy objectives will be
furthered, and incentive programs will operate more effectively if they incorporate
substantial elements of procedural fairness. These programs should therefore provide
considerable opportunities for meaningful and effective participation in their associated
decision-making pr~cesses.'~
In this paper, I develop that thesis with specific reference to the evolving structure and
operations of the Environmental Choice Program. The Environmental Choice Program,
which has been operating for some two years, involves the development of a federal
government owned ECOLOGO, the establishment of product specific environmental
guidelines, and the licensing of private manufacturers, distributors and retailers to use the
logo on products which comply with the guidelines. However, the theory on which the
thesis is based, suggests that it is applicable to a broad range of government incentive
programs.
The development of procedural fairness in the Environmental Choice and rclated
incentive programs recognizes the limitations on the resources available to public
bureaucracies, the fallibility of bureaucratic decision-making, and the political reality
within which public bureaucrats must operate. All of these are magnified when the state
attempts to use the market to pursue public policy objectives.
11. THE CONVERGENCE OF MARKETS AND PUBLIC POLICY

The primary public policy objective of the Program is the improvement, or the
reduction in the rate of deterioration of the environment, through the substitution in
consumer markets, of "ECOLOGOED" products and services for products and services
currently distributed in those markets.'"roducts
receive the ECOLOGO only if they
comply with environmental standards, and thus the primary program objective

II

'I

I'

the decision to renew or terminate a licence, or to rcncw a licence on other than its prior
terms.
I ;tm certain that many of the rights-hased lheorists will support thc policy prescription which 1 offer.
Likc thc some of the rights-based theorists. I acknowledp thc risks of concentrated power whether
in private or public bureaucracies. Effective participation may decrntralize power across political
actors, cconornic scctors, geographical areas, and special interest groups.
This is consistent with the language employed by several j u d p s in explaining their dccisions relating
to "pmcdural fairncss" and legitimatc expectations. See R. v. Liverpool Corpmmrir~n,119721 2 All
E.R. 5RY al 596 (procedural fairncss will assist council to perform its statutory dulics).
Subsidiary program ohjectives, and in part the operational means thmugh which the primary objective
will bc achieved, include addressing consumcr confusion relating to private initiatives involving
environmcntal labelling, offering incentives to the private sector for investments in research and
development in environmen~allysensitive consumer products and services, and educating consumers
about the complex links between "private" purchuse dccisions and the public envimnmental good.
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improving environmental quality through product substitution
depends on the
development of environmental standards which, if implemented, generate net
environmental benefits.
This primary policy objective of the Environmental Choice Program the reduction
in the total load on the environment as a result of the production, consumption and
disposal of consumer goods will be achieved through the substitution of ECOLOGOED
products for existing products. However, as the following analysis indicates, achieving that
policy objective is extremely difficult, and requires that the Program has relatively precise
information regarding the relationship between two variables: the environmental benefits
produced through the substitution of each unit of ECOLOGOED product, and the total
number of ECOLOGOED units which will bc sold as a result of the program. The way
in which environmental and market parameters interact to optimize the delivery of
program benefits is illustratcd below. The analysis makes clear that bureaucrats requirc
relatively precise information regarding the environmental loads of existing and potential
ECOLOGOED products, and the nature of thc relationship between the per unit
environmental benefit and total sales of the replacement products under the Program.

EC

=

the environmental load of onc unit of a non-ecologoed product
in a particular category, and which is subject to replacement by
an ecologoed product.

EQ

=

the environmental load of any one unit of an substituted
ECOLOGO product in a particular category.

u,,

=

the total unit sales of non-ccologoed products in a particular
category.

U,

=

the total unit sales of ECOLOGOED products within a
particular category.

L,,

=

the environmental load associated with the total production,
consumption and disposal of all non-ecologoed products in a
particular product category.

L,

=

the environmental load associated with thc total production,
consumption and disposal of all non-ecologoed products and
replacement products in a particular category.

R,

=

the ratio of the environmental load of one replacement unit to
an existing unit.

R,

=

the ratio of unit sales of replacement units to unit sales of
existing units.
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THEN:
L,,

=

ECUo

-

ECU,, - ECU, + EQU,

AND:
R,

=

!a

RANGE = 0 to I .O

EC
R,

=

U

-r

RANGE = O to 1.0

u,,
One can predict, as EQ approaches 0, and thus as R, approaches 0, that units sales of
replacement products will also approach 0. And when U,= 0, then

Similarly, if EQ (the environmental load of one unit of a replacement product) is not
reduced at all, then R, = 1, and the replacement product will be a perfect substitute Tor
the existing product. One can assume for the purposes of this analysis that all consumers
then make the substitution, given that they desire the environmental quality which is
apparently being supplied. and every other aspect of product performance is kept constant.
In this case. U, = U,,, and

That is, in the worst case environmental scenario, R, will approach 0, but R,, will also
approach O. Similarly, in the best case environmental scenario, we can assume that as R,
approaches I , that R, will also approach I .I4
By looking at Figure 1 one can better understand the nature of the problem confronting
the program. Knowledge about the way in which R, and R, vary with one another is
critical to the success of the program. All one knows, with any degree of certainty, is the
two endpoints, and it is the shape of the curve which counts! All of the program decisions
relate to the development of guidelines which generate EQ, and thus R,. And one can
predict R, only if one can accurately calculate EC and EQ. However, even perfect

'

If perfect suhstitulion does not takc place. then the shape ol' the curves becomes even more
problcrnaticill, as we no longcr know where the top right point is localcd! Thc assumption, whilc
necessury to draw the curves. may bc rtiislcadingly optimistic.
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information about EC and EQ, will, by itself produce no information about the function
in any intermediate position.

Figure 1
In order to minimize L, through the development of environmental guidelines, one needs
to know the way in which R, varies with R, that is, one needs to know the shape of the
curve.
The next stage in the analysis, which is illustrated in Figure 2, recognizes that in order
to maximize program benefits by minimizing L,, we must be able to calculate the unique
(R, R,,) function for each product category. It is obvious that if Reequals I, then L, will
equal Lo,since. although all replacement products will be sold, there will be no
environmental benefit produced by the substitution. Similarly, if R, equals 0,then L, will
again equal Lo,since there will be no replacement products sold. Minimizing L,, by
producing a specific EQ for a product category, requires that we know the (R, Ru)
function for the particular product category for which the environmental guideline is being
developed. That is, the new load (L,) is expressible in terms of the old load (Lo) and the
two ratios.

L,

=

ECU,- ECU,+ EQU,

L,

=

ECU,, - ECR,U,,

+ R,ECU,
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Figure 2 demonstrates the relationship between L, and EQ for three hypothetical Re R,
functions.'"

Figure 2
To reiterate, the primary objective of the Environmcntal Choice Program is to reduce
the total environmental load generated by the production, consumption and disposal of
consumer products that is, to minimize L, in each product category. However, knowing
whether Lnis being reduced, as well as knowing the magnitude of that reduction, requires
that one identify and measure EC and U, with some degree of accuracy. L is clear that
the environmental load of existing products (EC) is extremely difficult to identify and
quantify. EC is currently unknown for virtually all existing products. Even if EC could
be calculated for a product produced by a particular manufacturer, one must be able to
predict from which particular products demand will shift once consumers are given the
opportunity to choose ECOLGOED products. It is obvious, given a number of producers
and a range of product designs and manufacturing processes, that EC will not be constant
across all units within U,,.Thus the calculation of EC requires not only an environmental
impact analysis which generates EC for all existing products within a product category,
but also a market analysis of the shift in demand which will be generated by the
deployment of the ECOLOGO. It may be that those consumers who do purchase logoed
products are already buying products with low environmental loads, meaning that the
marginal per unit gains might be quite small.
In addition, knowing whether L, is being reduced, and knowing the magnitude of that
reduction, requires that EQ and U, be measured with some degree of accuracy. As with
the calculation of EC, the task of estimating the environmental load of ECOLOGOED
products is extremely difficult in fact, more difficult than estimating EC, given that in

'"

The imporrance of' knowing the uniquc R, R, function for each prtducr category is illusIraled in
Appcndix A.
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this case the new product may not be in prod~ction.'~
Similarly, calculating U, requires
accurate information about a range of variables including the number and identities of the
subset of all producers who will be able to comply with the environmental standards and
who will apply for the ECOLOGO, and the nature and degree of thc shift in consumer
demand for the new product.
Most importantly, setting environmental guidelines which reduce L,, must take into
account the relationship between EQ and U,. that is, as EQ is reduced towards 0, U, will
also likely be reduced towards 0." AS the environmental guidelines reduce the
environmental load associated with any olle unit of an ECOLOGOED product, thc rorul
number of units sold will fall. The result, unfortunately. is that optimizing program output
means developing environmental guidelines which do not necessarily reduce EQ to 0. but
rather reduce EQ, taking into account the reduction in U, such that L, is minimized.
Data necessary to calculate EC and EQ, as well as U,, and U,, requires not only
scientific environmental impact analyses, but also projected market analyses taking into
account pricing decisions and demand for substitutable consumer products, manufacturing
processes. sources of raw material, access to capital, the timing and feasibility of plant
modifications, and so on. There is little reason to believe that public bureaucracies have
the information upon which to base these market analyses, or have a great deal of
experience in making these kinds of business decisions. Participation by environmental
groups, independent scientists and the relevant industry will contribute significantly to the
program's ability to ascertain these variables. Effective participation in program decisionmaking will assist in predicting the way in which EQ and U, relate to one another across
a particular industry, given the distribution of capital, technology, access to raw materials,
plant equipment and location, elasticity of demand for particular products, consumer
demand for envimnmental "quality" in consumer goods, and so on, within that industry.
Procedural fairness which permits public bureaucrats access to the private sector in a
structured and strategic way, is the only way to generate information which defines the
complex relationships between these variables.
The economic rationale of the program acknowledges that market failures may occur;
but the program addresses market failure with market mechanisms rather than through
traditional command models of government regulation. Environmental degradation
represents a negative externality generated by private market transactions. The

IR

I1

Precise quantilication of EQ is almost inipossiblc. First. estimating EQ is extremely difficult givcn
the abscnce of a developed methodology for environmental impact analysis of many products or
services. Second, thc methodology. evcn if defensible, must he applied to proposcd products and
serviccs. producing extremely unccrtain predictions. Finally, ilctual (as opposed to expected) EQ will
depend on the degree of individual manufacturer compliance with thc cnvironmcntal standards at
givcn levels and strategies of monitoring and enforcement by the program.
That is, as envimnmental standards are made more rigorous, total sales may clrcrecrsc. duc to
increased production cosls and thus priccs, and to a reduction in the number of suppliers who can
produce goods which comply with the standards given existing distributions of raw materials,
technology, and gw)graphical and markel prtduct shares. What the program attempts to do is to
develop environmental guidelines which optimize the generation of environmental benefits. given
these two inversely related vwiables.
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Environmental Choice Program is based on the idea that improvements in environmental
quality represenl apositive externality which might similarly be generated through private
market transactions.
To date, environmental benefits are likely being underproduced for several reasons.
First, consumers may not enjoy a credible signal describing the environmental
characreristics of consumer goods which they can employ in making purchase decisions.
Second, producers of the environmental improvement, given its public good character,
may under-invest in its production, since many more persons than the purchaser will enjoy
the environmental benefits without having to, or being able to reflect their choices in the
market. Third, some producers of "environmental improvement" may not be able to
recoup their production costs where consumers are skeptical of private claims of
environmental responsibility. The state, through an investment of public resources in
creating a credible ECOLOGO, and through the distribution of the right to use the
ECOLOGO, simultaneously addresses the information imperfections which now
characterize this market,'' and rewards firms which engage in conduct which produces
the environmental good."
However, the foregoing analysis of the way in which regulatory policy and markets in
consumer products interact confirms that it is unlikely that incentive programs, like the
Environmental Choice Program, could be expected to work perfectly. Procedural fairness
is a regulatory response which recognizes that regulatory models, while necessary to the
program design process, are never perfectly replicated in practice. What one can predict
is that the Environmental Choice Program, like many government incentive programs,
may be subject to what may be called second order market failure which prevents it from
achieving optimal public benefits.
The Environmental Choice Program assumes that environmental degradation is due, at
least in part, to market failure i n the production of consumer goods and services. The

''

1,)

One problem which has not yet been addrcsscd adequately is the intractable problem of quantifying
the "public good" represented by a reduction in the rate of environmental degradation. While the
market is used to produce thc good, one cannot conclude that the aggregate demand for this
environmental good can be measured simply by an examination of the increased dcmand for logoed
products. There is no reason to believe that consumers can accuralcly understand, predict and quantify
the amount of environmental bcnetit which their purchase is generating, and compare it to the
increased price, if any, demanded for the good. We may be able to say that the purchase decision is
evidence of sor11c demand. but its quantification is impossible. We cannot say, even though the
program uses the market to gencrate the benefit, that the cost of prcducing the envimnmental gtwd
is less than that henefits it produces, we can only say that the cost is less than the perceived benefits
manifested thn)ugh market t~.ans;~ctions.
From the perspective of industry taken as a whole, incentive programs represent opportunities to
obtain rcsources from the public treusury. The distributional implications arc mdically different from
those associated with most co~nmand models of regulation which create risks of contributing
resources to government through fines and other forms of levied charges. Thc Environmental Choice
Program can be analogized to the use of subsidies or tax incentives, hut may he unique in that it
involves the transfer of a property right which is easily transfbrmable into cash by firms. hut is
relatively inexpensive to produce by the government. It thus differs in an important way from
traditional subsidies and thus may be employcd in environmental regulation where subsidies have not.
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program is a market based policy instrument designed to addrcss that market failure. But
the program itself is subject to a range of its own second order market failures:
a) the development and distribution of the entitlement might he plagued by
informational problems including the non-disclosure by the program of the criteria of
eligibility for the entitlement, lack of information about the environmental costs and
benefits of the environmental standards and proposed licensed products, lack of
information about the shifts in market shares generated by the program, and the
inability of consumers to monitor and assess the environmental benefits associated with
their purchase of ECOLOGOED products;
b) the development of the criteria for the issuance of the entitlement, as well as
individual licensing decisions, might gcnerate negative externalities. These might
include the adverse impact of the guideline and issuance of licences on other firms and
individuals; and
the market for the entitlement might be characterized by situational and market
monopolies where environmental benefits may be underproduced, too high a price
charged by the government as supplicr, and where recipients of the ECOLOGO may
be exploited during the term of the licence or on licence renewal.
C)

While procedural due process will not, of itself, correct all kinds of second order
market failures, it may indirectly reduce the likelihood of their occurrence.'" In other
words. the development of fair processes will generate soricrl benefits, not merely private
benefits to the licensees. Demanding fair bureaucratic processes should further and not
obstruct the achievement of environmental policy objectives through improved definition
and allocation of entitlements.
The point cannot be made too adamantly. So long as the legal community attempts to
legally coerce bureaucrats through "process control", the best one can hope to achieve is
that burcaucrats will establish "fair" processes which they view as necessary evils
obstructive, expensive and to be largely ignored in developing and implementing public
policy. If, however, it can be argued and demonstrated that fair processes will further
hureuucra/ic objectives, the public sector is much more likely to develop bureaucratic
decision-making processes which will be rationally linked to the specific public policy
context within which they operate; and which will, in fact, generate views and data which
will be considered and thus influence bureaucratic choices.

"'

One might argue that the state should generally defer to the market as the rnorc cffcctive regulatory
vehicle to control the exercise of power in market trimsaclions paradigrnalically consensual, wcalth
maximizing arrangerncnls. Howcvcr, it is difficult to imagine the market vehicle which might hc uscd
to correct second ordcr rnarkct failurcs in thc Environmental Choice Program.
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111. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM
The Environmental Choice program is an admittedly modest example of an economic
instrument designed to regulate corporate and human activity affecting the environment."
Specifically, the program attempts to modify both producer behaviour in product
development, and consumer purchasing behaviour, through the governmental development
and distribution of a marketable entitlcmenr the contractual right to use a government
owned ECOLOGO.
The program, simplified to an extreme. involves four stages. First, the Environmental
Choice Board2*selects and tentatively detincs a "product cat~gory."'~
Very early on in
this process, the Board obtains a "life cycle" environmental impact analysis of the
proposed product category. To date, the program has addressed some 50 categories
ranging from re-usable diapers, re-refined motor oil, low solvent water based paints, to
tine paper products made from recycled fibre.
The sccond stage of the program involves the development, using the Canadian
Standards ~ssociation" and voluntary multi-sectoral task forces, of environmental
guidelines issued by the Minister of the Environment under the Ccir~udianEnvirorrmenral
Protecrion Act. Thc guidelines are based on thc environmental impact assessmenl, are
specific to each product catcgory, and address the performance and design characteristics
with which products must comply in order to display the ECOLOGO.~"

''

As an econo~nicinstrument. it is not surprising that i t is being cniployetl in purely privatc initiatives.
For cxanlple, the Amcrican Hcam Associi~tionhas considered developing ;I hcart shaped "sail of
approval" and licensing private firms, for a fee approaching $4(~.O(N).to uhe the logo on products
which have hccn certified by the Assc~i:~tion.The Unitcd States Ucpwtme~ito f Agriculture has
activcly opposed this initiative, considering it simplistic; and some members of thc private sector
havc called i t a "marketing gimmick".
Thc Roard i s estahlishcd under s. 5 of the Ccr~rc~ditr,lG ~ v i r r ~ l ~ ~I'roti~crifn~
l l r ~ r t Act R.S.C. 1985, C. C15.3 as an Advisory Board to the Ministcr of the Environmcnt. I t consists o f IS persons and ;I Chair
appointcd by the federil Minister of the Environmcnt for inderinitc tcrms. Currently thc Board
consists of' reprcscntatives of consumer groups. environmental groups, scveral science and serial
science disciplines. and i~idustry.
'"roduct
catcgory sugges~ionsarc somcti~ncsgenerated intcrnally within thc program. More olicn. thc
Board draws on suggestions from external sources including. product m;~nuFicturcrsand suppliers,
environmental and consumer gl.oups, and individual consumers.
"
Enviror~mentCanada hils contracted with the Canadian Standards Association to pmvidc this service.
Thc CSA has suhstimtii~lnational and international credibility in devcloping consunier and industrial
standards. Howcvcr. the CSA is simply an administrative infrastructure
it providcs sccretwiat
services (or the task forces which consist crf voluntary industry, environmcnbal and consumer. and
government reprcscntatives. Thc CSA does not sct stand;lrds. nor docs it engage in research on which
the standarcis are based.
n"'
developing ~ h cnvironmenlal
c
guidelines, Environmcnt Canada has hccn guided by a conccm that
all propo.scd products and services encomp:~sscdby the pnvgram will generate a net environrncntal
benefit taking into accounl the entirc lirc-cycle of thc scn'ice or product, consistcnt with the complete
product life-cyclc conccpt inherent in the Cftirrrrrdicttr D n i r ~ ~ t t m mPrort~cfir~rr
ri~l
Acr, .tuprcr note 22.
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After the promulgation of the environmental guideline, individual manufacturers,
importers or retailers are licensed, for a fee, to use the ECOLOGO.'~ The most
significant aspect of the licensing program involves product testing and confirmation that
a particular product or group of products complies with the environmental guideline
requirements.
Finally, all licensed users are monitored to ensure compliance with the licence's terms
and the environmental guidelines. The term of the licence is one year, and the licensing
agreement permits spot audits of manufacturing plants and access to all relevant
production and purchase records. Sanctions for non-compliance include contract
termination and product recalls, and damage recovery by the government.
In contrast to tradilional regulatory instruments, the program does not prohibit private
action subject to compliance with mandatory standards enforceable through the
administrative or judicial process. No industry participant is required to use the
ECOLOGO or to comply with the environmental guidelines. However, the success of the
program is based on evidence which suggests that industry will face competitive pressures
to do so, and will comply if they believe that the market benefits of the liccnce exceed
the costs incurred to produce products in compliance with the environmental guidelines."
In a very real sense, all aspects of the program acknowledge that the participants control
the program's agenda and direction, and thus will determine how the transition to an
economy which is linked to the environment will take place.
IV. A CASE STUDY PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM

Procedural fairness describes the set of institutional structures and decision-making
processes which permits potentially affected individuals and groups to participate
effectively in decisions affecting their intere~ts.~"his paper addresses the institutional
structures and processes which relate directly to the two classes of major decisions the
Environmental Choice Board makes on an ongoing basis. The first CATEGORY 1

!"

''
'n

The issue of the l i ~ a independencc
l
of the prngranl is extremely problematic in tcrrns of program
effectiveness. The fact that thc Program bcncfits financially through the licensing process creates an
incentive to devclop lower envinmmental standards in order to maximize thc number of licensed
users and thus program revenues. While it is truc as explained k l o w in Part 2 that lower standards,
(that is standards which generate a somewhat higher EQ) are not per se undesirable, it is true that
systems which gcncratc higher EQs present a risk or producing a negative (EC - EQ). which would
be undesirable under any conditions.
The Program licensing fcc ranges from $300.00 to $5,000.00 based on annual net sales and thus
d m s not prcscnt substantial cc~slscvcn to small producers.
In theory, concepts of p r n ~ e d u ~fitirness
l
in bureaucratic institutions and processes can encompass
u11 aspects of incentive programs. Fairncss issues are presented by the institutional structure of
government programs whether they arc intra-departmental, utilizing "special operaling agency sliatus,"
or are esrablished as Crown corporations. Fairness issues arise in connection with the processes and
criteria for the appointment of regulatory decision-makers. Fairness is affected by access to resources
of potential participants. Fairness can encompass disclosure of regulatory policy, criteria and
decisions. All program structures, prcresses and policies which relate to effective parlicipalion might,
and perhaps should, be assessed in terms of fairness ideals.
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decisions involves the definition of the "entitlement". These decisions include the choice
of a specific product category, the development of its related environmental guideline, and
the negotiation of the substantive terms of the licensing agreement. The second
CATEGORY 2 decisions involves the allocation of the entitlement to a particular
applicant. This category includes the licensing and de-licensing of particular manufacturers
to use the ECOLOG0.29
The critical constituent elements of procedural fairness in both categories are access to
information,"' effective participation in decision-making," and appeal and review
processes." The program has, from the outset, attempted to afford potentially affected
parties considerable opportunity to participate in both categories. Fairness considerations
have been used to justify access to information, opportunities for effective participation,
and recently, the development of several review processes. More importantly, one can
identify a significant trend towards an expansion of these process rights as the program
has matured.
A. CATEGORY ONE DECISIONS

It is difficult to predict whether a court would say that Category 1 decisions the
development of voluntary guidelines under the Environmental Choice Program and the
substantive content of the licensing contract trigger procedural fairness obligations on

'

"

"

Both the private value of the entitlement (the net benefit lo producers of the right to use the
ECOLOGO), as well u.5 thc social value of the entitlement (thc net environmental benefit produced
by product substitution), are established by the combination of CATEGORY I and CATEGORY 2
decisions.
Informational issues in environmental standard setting are extremely complex. First. many of the
Board's decisions are founded on scientific data which is the subject of debate within the scientific
community itself. Second, the information basc is not static. With decisions evolving over a 12-18
month pcriod, one has to develop procedures to ensure ongoing review and updating of the
information base of those decisions. Third, disclosure of extremely complicated technical information
to non-experts is an exercise in futility, and thus one must address thc translation of that information
hoth within the program and to affected parties. Fourth, the information which is the subject of
disclosure is extremely varied. relating to the envimnmcntal impact analyses on which the guidelines
are based, the use of single or multi-factorial sets of criteria by the Board, and the weighting, rink
or emphasis which the Board is placing on ccrtain environmental bencfits or risks. Finally, the Board
as pan of Department of the Environment is subject to the limitations on disclosure established under
the Access 10 Itfirnf(ttiot~Acl R.S.C. 1985. c. A-I.
Here, the Board has taken into account the identity of the parties to whom information must be
disclosed, the disclosure of rcports while in drift form, the use of informal consultative processes,
concerns with equal access both within industrial sectors and betwcen industry and environmental
groups, and thc delegation of decision-making authority to subordinate groups within which rnultisectoral representation is cnsured.
Appeal processes can be established both at thc initiul guideline setting stage and in respect of
individual licensing and licence termination decisions. In hoth cases, one must asses whether the
appeal should he internal or external to the program, the identity of the appellate decision-makers.
the grounds of appeal, standing requirements, and the unavoidable existence of bureaucratic and
political review.
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the part of the government and thus the B~ard.'~'However, as suggested carlier, the
Board has made a deliberate choice to incorporate substantial procedural fairness in
respect of all of the constituent elements of CATEGORY ONE decisions.
In deciding which product categories are to be addrcsscd in the Program, a wide
ranging consultative process through the Canadian Environmental Network has been
initiated. This process communicates requests for product categories to hundreds of nongovernmental environmental groups across the country. Similar initiatives have bcen takcn
with industry trade associations. These two institutional initiatives havc bccn linked to
more diffuse public information programs through which the same request has been
made.34 As well, the Board has disclosed the criteria which it employs in selecting
Although a statistical analysis of the
product categories for preliminary inve~tigation.'~
ratio of product category suggestions to completed guidelines has not been carried out, at
least YO% of the final guidelines have their source in one or more public suggestion^..'^
Second, the Board, in producing a life cycle environmental impact assessment of each
proposed product category, has actively searched out technical, scientific, environmental.
and market related information from both public interest groups and specific industry
members." Improved procedures which the Board is seeking to implement would ensure
that all of ~ h cinformation comprising the environmental impact analysis is reviewed by
potentially affectcd parties as early on in the process as is possible
including its
developmental stage.
Third, from thc outsct of the program, the Board has disclosed the gcncral criterion
which it has employed in making its decisions on the detailed content of environmental
guidelines:

'

.XI

".'hese

>h

"

While these decisions rank as a scnior multi-fi~ctnrial policy decision in the hicrarchy of decisions
which thc Board ~nakes.the cases make i t clear that i f reprcscntations arc made by public hodics.
they nwy be pr1)tectedthrough administrative rcvicw processes regirrdless ol'the lcvcl ol'governrnent
which engages in the inforniation disclosure. Scc Ng,v. Alroniry (;c,~rrrcrl,fi>r
H o t i ~KOIIX,atprcr notc
9.
These prngrnms include a ncwslcttcr. ax well SI; numerous in pcrson and electronic rlicdia
prcwntations by program staff and Baard membcrs. A complete list of the prcscnlalions is availahle
from the ECP. See Minutcs ul' ECP, September 10. 1 1 1990, Montreal. Quchcc.
criteria. in rank order ol' importance. ive cxpcc~cd cnvir~>nmentalhcnct'its, market
considerations, technical feasibility. salience, timing, and stratcgic Icadership. Discussions at thc
original Board meeting indicated that the first two l':rtors arc suhstanlially morc imponnnt than thc
final four.
The original and cxtmmcly tcntativc choicc of potential product catcgorics clearly cmatcs "lxotcntial"
winners and loscl.s in the regulatory prwcss. But at this stag. p;lrticipatory rights would be very
pr~,blematical. Many selected categories are not pursucd. Ahscnt a vehicle lo idcntify potentially
affected panics (impossible without first knowing what thc cnvironnlental impact analysis mighl
contain) prcxcdural rights would bc an cxcrcisc in futility. Nonethelcss. given the irnpclnancc of
identifying inlcrestcd parties at this curly stage (of the proccss, rccommcndntions havc bccn considered
by the Board to issue a notice of our intcntior~to investignte pmposcd categories through mass nicdia
and the Cirr~trtltrGit:rrrr.
Thc Board dtxs not usc intcrnnl staff to prcpan. the environ~ncntalimpact ;ul;~lysis. hut contricts out
Ihe work l o cnviri~nmentalconsultants. Explicit instruction is given to thc person preparing the report
to consult with industry in thc prcparation ol' the report.
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The product. service, process or packaging. whcn compared with other products, services and packaging
fulfilling the same function, and when taken its entirety, must bc charactcrized by a particularly high
degree of environmental soundness taking into account product performance and safety.

It is true that by itself this vague criterion is unlikely to offer potentially affected
parties sufficient information to permit effective participation in program decision-making.
Nonetheless, it remains an important aspect of procedural fairness in three ways. First,
it discloses that, while economic impacts cannot be ignored given the use of markets in
generating environmental improvements, the Board does not engage in "trading off'
environmental improvement for economic concerns. Second, the criterion discloses that
the guidelines arc intended to ensure that product performance and safety are not unduly
sacrificed for environmental benefits. Finally, the precise product characteristics which
will generate the anticipated environmental benefits
necessary information to all
potentially affected parties will be disclosed through the environmental impact analyses
discussed above.
Fourth, in constituting the task forces in which specific environmental guidelines are
developed, the Board has attempted to ensure representation by industry participants
whose interests may not coincide, by a range of consumer and environmental groups, as
well as by independent experts. This process is supported by the creation of a
"Coordinating Technical Committee" (CTC) responsible for the operation of the task
forces. The CTC consists of independent experts; a CTC member chairs each task force;
and part of the responsibility of the CTC chair is to ensure that affected groups are
represented at what is perhaps the most critical stage of decision-making in the program
the development of the substantive content of the environmental guidelines by multisectoral task f ~ r c e s . ~ "
Fifth, all environmental guidelines are published in draft and then final form as Ordersin-Council undcr section 10 of The Environmenful Protection Act in the Canada Gazette.
Thus a formal comment period of at least 60 days is afforded to all members of the
public. This formal notice and comment process, while it might appear to come too late
to have a significant impact on the substantive content of the guidelines, is far from a
procedural sham. The Board has designed a process which generates a report from the
program Secretariat which summarizes all received comments, with the submitter
identified, when it considers each proposed guideline for final recommendation to the
Minister of the Environment. Again, while statistics are not available, a significant
percentage of guidelines have been modified in significant ways between the draft and
final recommendation to the ~ i n i s t e r . ~ '

''

11

While the Board docs not hold formal hearings in the guideline drveloprnent process, it has, in the
formulation of the "Sanitary Paper from Recycled Papcr" guidelinc, cstablished a sub-committee of
the Board to receive a submission from a piinicular nianufacturcr and to rcpon to the Bwird on the
substance of the submission which was directed to the content of the proposed guidclinc.
As well, on several occasions, comments have resultcd in mtdifications of related guidelines. and of
the gcneral guidelinc requirements. For examplc. comments lium the Wesl Coilst Environmental Law
Association rcsulted in personal mectings between WCELA rcprcsentatives and a Board
representative. and in modifications to the guideline which relatc to CEO attestation of compliance
with environmental legislation by licenscd companies.
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Sixth, final decisions on all environmental guidelines are made by the Minister of the
Environment on the advice of the Board under section 8(1) of the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act. There is not now any formal internal appeal process which
might be used by adversely affected parties to challenge the recommendation of the Board
But one must recognize that at least
to the Minister in respect of a particular g~ideline.~''
some affected parties will attempt to influence the Department through submissions to
scnior line bureaucrats, to other departmental bureaucrats or to Ministerial staff, and thus
attempt to influence the Minister of the Environment not to accept the Board's advice."
The Board has addressed this issue through consultations with the Department, through
signals to the Minister describing the importance of solidarity between the Department and
Board, and most importantly through the development of the procedures described above
which assure the Minister of the procedural fairness and technical rigour of the Board's
work.
The Board is currently designing an internal review process which would permit an
affected party to seek a Board review of its recommendation based either upon
information which was unavailable at the time the relevant task force developed the
substantive content of the guideline, or on procedural fairness grounds.4'
The final stagc in the definition of the entitlement created by the Environmental Choice
Program is the process by which the substantive content of the licensing agreement is
determined. As described above, the set of contract terms together with the environmental
criteria in the environmental guideline define the program entitlement. The original
licensing agreement involved modifications to a standard Canadian Standards Association
licensing agreement, which was carried out in "private" by the Board, Justice Department
advisors. and legal advisors to the Canadian Standards Association. The degree of public
participation in developing the contract was minima^.^.'
The substantive terms of the licensing agreement to usc the ECOLOGO generate the
bilateral benefits characteristic of exchange transactions. However, this contract, like all
contracts, permits both parties to exercise power, in their own interests, against the other.

.''I

''

"

"'

Even more difficult would be the development of appeal rights in respect of "decisions" not to make
recommendations to Ministers. To companies which would otherwise benefit from the creation of a
product category, the decision to not act is as significant as the dccision to make the recommendation.
In a significant numbcr of cases. however, thc inaction is a product of henign neglect rathcr than
delihcratc focused choices. The absence of a decision which would trigger the appeal process renders
formal appcal rights somcwhat difficult to implement.
This in fact has happened on at lcast one occasion where an unsuccessful, but cxtre~nelyvigorous
lobbying effori was undenaken by a specific company md trildc association in an attempt to persuade
the Minister of thc Environmcnt to refuse to sign the Ordcr-in-Council creating the guideline. The
existencc of this "appcal" right is beyond thc opcrational control of the Program given the Advisory
Board status of the Board, and the current requirement that the guidelines be published as Ordcrs-inCouncil.
The procedure would involvc notification of all parties who participated in the original guideline
dcvclopmcnt process.
Two Bwrd members from the private sector were asked to assess thc tcrms in light of their
experience and sectc~ralinterests.
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Procedural safeguards applied to the exercise of contract power might be derived either
from private contract law "fairness" doctrinesu or from public law "due process"
requirements. Fairness review will involve either an assessment of the monopolistic nature
of the market in credible environmental logos,J5 or explicit judicial review of at least
some of the substantive terms of the contracts where the government is a party to the
transaction.*
At this point in thc program's evolution, it is clear, regardless of any legal obligation
to involve affected parties in the original contract drafting process, that the program would
have benefited from that involvement. The program entitlement defined in part by the
contract terms is not optimal, and thus the program has commenced the process of
modifying the standard form contract language employed in the licensing agreement.
These modifications were initiated simultaneously by a suggestion from a potential
licensec,J7by the ~oard,"' and through consultation with a public interest environmental
group."'

Bccause of the value to the program of involving as many segments of the various
"publics" as possible in the program's decision-making processes, and because
modifications to the contr-act will, in effect, constitute a "renegotiation" of the licensing
arrangement with current licensees, several procedures have been initiated to encourage

'

JS

.lb

"'
in

'

Conccpls crf pnsedural due process have only rarcly been applied to rcgulatc the bilalcr:~lnegotiation
of contract ohligiations in the private scctor involving commerci;tl arrangements betwccn sophisticated
paliics such as arc likely to he found negotiating with the governmcnt in thc Envimnmcntal Choicc
Program. Procedural duc proccss in tnarket Innsuctions has becn developed by thc courts through
the application of common law conccpts of unconscionability and "unfair surprise" which h;tve k e n
employed to regulate Ihc prcxcdurul cnvirvnmcnt under which exchi~ngctransactions takc placc.
With relatively sophisticutcd industry participants. assessments ol'thc pncedural fairncss of the
contt~actingproccss in the Environmcntul Choice program will likely not involvc informational
concerns. Moreover, lhcre is little evidcnce that the couns could adrquatcly assess thc compctitive
envirunment within which the program operates, and even if they could, the prvgram design demands
that ~ h cgovcrnmcn~niust offer benelits thrctugh the logotcontract conihitiation which exceed
compli;incc costs lo the priv;ilc sector licetlsccs.
In a recent decision, the Supreme Coun of Canada in Rocrrcl ~ ~ E ~ l ~ ~ i ~
~,j'Ilcc.
r r r i hrdicrrr
o r r H r ~ ~School
tl
Di~~isiorr
No. I9 r ~ f . S t r s C c t r ~ ~ l r c ~ v.
~ ~ 'Krri.yh/,
trn
[IYWI I S.C.R. 653, held that the considcn~tionof rhc
t'airncss ohligations of governmcnt in its role as contractor. must go beyond intcrpretativc contrnctu;ll
analysis to "encompass argunients of public policy." Madamc Justice 1,'Heureux Dub6 said that the
substantivc fairness of the contract termination provisions would be subjcct to judicial review.
independent of ally procedural unfairness in the contract negotiation proccss.
In particular. a potential licenscc which manufiactured pilints was concerned with the tcrtnination
powers allocated to the governmcnt in thc contract.
Analysis of the contract language has Icd to two concerns. First, thc ilutotnatic rcnewal of the ennui11
licencc presents a greater risk of judicial revicw on the hasis ol'a "lcgitimatc expectation" argununt.
than would automatic termination couplcd with an iniplicit and perhaps expedited rcnewal pnrcss.
Second. the discretionary lermination rights enjoyed by the government in response to a breach by
the licenseo niight give rise l o buwaucratic or political obstruction. as con1p;ircd to rhe cl'fixl of' an
"autoniutic" ternmination provision.
The West Coast Environmenc;il Law Association. with o~hcrsubmitters. su.cgcstcd that the lcrlns of
the Guideline wcrc atnbiguous in relation to hoth CEO attestation of compliaricc with environmental
Icgislation and with the consequcnccs ol'non-compliance with thc legisli~tion.Some ol'lhosc concerns
:Ire ;tddressahlc through the terms oI' the licensing contract.
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public input in the contract redefinition process." First, notice of the draft agreement will
be published in several trade journals and newspapers. Second, the Canadian
Environmental Network and industry trade associations will be utilized to distribute copies
of the draft agreement to interested parties. Finally, current licensees will be consulted on
an individual basis to discuss with each of them the contractual modifications which are
being considered affording them notice of the change at an extremely early stage in the
process, and the opportunity to contribute to the final product.
6. CATEGORY TWO DECISIONS

It is difficult at this stage in the evolution of the Program to describe the process
employed in CATEGORY 2 decisions the allocation of the entitlement through the
licensing and de-licensing of manufacturers to use the ECOLOGO. So far. the program
has generated numerous CATEGORY 1 decisions which have led to the development of
many of the procedural components described above. However, the program has very little
experience with contentious licensing applications, and has yet to de-license or fail to
renew a licence."

Several recent decisions suggest that judges may not be overly sensitive to claims that
the receipt of government benefits either through employment contracts or direct grants
generate procedural fairness obligations on "legitimate expectation" grounds.52
Nonetheless, imponant procedural components have been incorporated in this aspect of
program operations, and again it is Board policy that this ought to be done irrespective
of legal requirements to afford procedural fairness to potential or actual Iicen~ees.~~

"

'

'"

So long as noticc and procedural fairness is provided, there does not appear to be an insurmountable
problem with "changing courses in mid-stream." However. thcre are certainly remarks in several of
the "legitimate expectations" decisions which suggest that government agencies cannot depart from
"undertakings" except afer affording affected parties prwcdural fairness nnd if .sutisfird thut the
overriding public: interest requires the depurture. That latter requirement would trilnsform a pure
process right into something radically different. See R. v. Liverpool Corporurion, 119721 2 All E.R.
589 pcr Lord Denning at 594: R. v. Secretary of'Stote, Ex Purte Kuhn, 1 19851 1 All E.R. 40 per Lord
Parker at 46, 48.
With one exception, all applicants have been licensed or been refused a licence without engaging in
any serious debate over their right to use the ECOLOGO. That is, the application of our rules
(environmental guidelines) to the specific facts of an applicant's manufacturing process or product
has given rise lo only one case which while not close to the line. did present the Program with a
situation which it had not contemplated. In that case, a manufacturer of garbage bags made from
recycled plastic applied for a licence to use the ECOLOGO in accordance with ECP-03-1990 "Plastic
Products from Recycled Plastic." Program staff quite correctly anticipated that the Board, when it
developed lhe guideline, had nut considered that it might be applied to garbagc bags. a product which
the Bimrd might not want to be part of the program for a number of rea.ions. The msnufacturcr was
asked to defer its application while the matter was considered by the Board.
Scc Toronto Independent Dunce Enterprise v. Canudu Counc.il(IY89) 38 Admin L. R. 23 1 (F.C.T.D)
(no procedural fairness applicable to non-renewal of government grant); Xuinhow v. Central
Ohnugan School District #37 (1988). 10 B.C.L.R. (2d) 137 (B.C.S.C) (no Fairness obligations in
respect of non-renewal of employment contracl).
There is little doubt that, in some cases, the "contractual" power exercised by the state will be subject
t ( the
~ same kinds of procedural constraints as legislative and regulatory authority. See R. v. S c c r e f r t ~
r,SSnrte, &.r Pcrrrr Kuhtz, supra, note 50; Council civil Service Urrions cind others v. Minister for
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Important fairness considerations arise during the earliest stages of the licensing
process. There is some authority for the view that the government owes a duty of fairness
which requires it to "consider and analyze an application which has been made".s4 The
program has, apparently, deliberately considered every application to dctcrmine if the
applicant's product or service comes within the product category definition.
The second stage in the licensing process, after tentative approval of the application by
the Canadian Standards Association, is the verification by CSA employees of compliance
by the applicant with the requirements of the environmental guideline. To date, no
applicant has been refused a licence and disputcd either an interpretation of a guideline,
or the facts determined by the CSA in its verification process. This may be due lo the
considerable expertise enjoyed by the CSA in this area, coupled with the considerable
involvement of the private sector in developing the substantive criteria contained in the
guideline. Nonetheless, it is likely that the program will develop an internal review
process to assess both interpretative and factual disputes in this context.
The program's final decision-making process involves decisions to modify, terminate
or fail to renew existing licences. There are three ways in which licensees may be able
to develop "procedural fairness" arguments in this context." First, they might argue that
the licence irseif should be interpreted as providing for procedural fairness the content
of procedural fairness in this context will be decided, in part, by reference to the terms
of' that contract." Many procedural rights are created as contract dispute resolution terms
in the licensing agreement which "regulates" contract termination and renewal as pan of
the contractual relationship between the government and the licensed users.
The contract now employed may provide some foundation for the argument that
procedural fairness should be afforded applicants in the case of termination or nonrenewal of their licences." Clause 8.2 of the contract permits immediate termination by

'

55

'
"

the Civil Senlice, 11985) I A.C. 374 at 40-10.
In a recent decision, the Trial Division of the Federal Court rcfuscd to permit thc Ghcrmezian
brothers to continue thcir participation in a tcndcring process for a $2OO,DOO,OtX) contract to build
Transport Canada's new hcadquaners. The plaintiffs brought an action to require the Minister of
Public Works to evaluate a bid which they had submitted through two holding companies: Calmar
Qucbcc Ltee and Les Placements Alize du Qucbcc. Sce Globe and Mail, Report on Business (27
April 1989) a1 BI I . Similarly, in J b l Harris L J ~ .v. Minister of Errrrcy.v. suprcr note 9, the New
Zealand High Coun held thlrt rcvicw of statutory powers could apply to the case of a disappointed
contriictor who had unsuccessfully tendered on a government contract.
A fourth source of procedural Fairness arguments i s statutory language which might be viewed as
requiring either certain procedures in the licensing process, or as demanding certain substanlive
license terms. There is nothing obvious in reading the Cn~ttrdimEnvironmenfal Protection Act .supra
note 22 which might he used to justify this kind of claim.
The proccdurcs employed in creating the suhsun~ivecontract lcrrns wcrc dcscribed carlicr in the
description of CATEGORY ONE decisions.
Several cases suggest that thc excrcise of contract power will, if silen~,be subject to judicial
"inlerpretation" so as to afford the private sector considerable protection from government
"renegotiation" of contract terms. Thus in Wf*b.v/er v. Aucklc~ndHorbnur Board. 119831 I N.Z.L.R.
646 at 650 the Ncw Zcaland Coun ol' Appeal held that the defendant in attempting lo increase the
rcnl chargcd li)r a waterfronl lease from $1.00 to $640.00, "in exercising contractual powen. ...may
also be restricted by its public law responsibilities".
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the government for breach of any of the contract or guideline terms, or on 30 days notice
without cause. There are no appeal rights in the contract, although clearly a licensee
would have the right to sue the government for breach of contract if it could demonstrate
that the government was not contractually entitled to terminate. However, the standard
form guideline contemplates an appeal from a decision to terminate for non-compliance
with environmental legislation. Clause 9.3 of the contract provides that the license to use
the ECOLOGO will be renewed automatically unless terminated, but is silent on the
process which might be employed to determine to not renew a licence. Finally, the
contract is silent on the procedure which the government may use to terminate a licence
for non-compliance with the licensing terms or with associated environmental

guideline^.^^
A second source of "procedural unfairness" in the licence renewal or termination
process arises from thc potential conflict between licensee expectations derived from
information received from pmgram staff,"' which is inconsistent with cxplicit contractual
language. While thal issue has not arisen in a CATEGORY 2 decision, the program has
had some experience with allegations that program staff have misdescribed the criteria
cmployed in the entitlement definition process.

The third and final source of procedural fairness in this stage of the Program derives
from judicial "due process" directives which are not subject to contractual modification.
At least one recent decision has held that the consideration of the fairness obligations of
government in thc contcxt of employment contracts must go beyond interpretative
conuactual analysis to "encompass arguments of public policy"."
The program is currently addressing these concerns in several ways. First, the program
is currently considering re-designing the contract to reduce the ambiguity associated with
the "substantive entitlement" issue and the re-application process. The substantive
whether the contract should bc interpreted as an ongoing licence
entitlement issuc
subject to an annual option to "terminate" or an "annual" licence subject to a right to
apply for another licence is being resolved in favour of the latter. As well, the reapplication process is being explicitly defined as identical to the original application
pro~ess.~'
Finally, the program is evaluating provisions providing for automaric
termination of the licence for breach of the contract terms or for non-compliance with the
environmental guidelines, coupled with explicit appeal rights on termination or non-

511

"
'

"

As described above, in a recent decision, the Suprcmc Courl of Canada in Botrrd (?/'Educrtrbrzoj'lhi~
Irrdirm Hrcrd School Division No. I 9 of S~tskrttchrwrarv . Krtighl, srtpru notc 46. held that the
substantive fairness of thc contract termination provisions would he subject to judicial review.

indepcndcnt of any procedurnl unfairness in the contract negotia~ionprtxess. The Court held further
that contractual silence will not he considcrcd a waivcr of thc application oI'thc duly to act fairly.
And any vthcr povcrnmcntal source of program information.
See, &)ard cd' Edu~.utitnr($/he 111diurtHmrd School Division No. I 9 o j ' S~~skurc:hen~urr
v. Krriglr~,
supm notc 46. There is no indication that "public policy" mcans ~ h cachicvement of pn~grnm
objectives!
Subject only to retn~activeopcrativn to cnsurc that the liccncc will always conlinuc in cflicct
notwithstanding delays in thc rc-applicalion process.
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renewal. The appeal rights will be linked to noticc of the grounds for termination? and
the development or remedial measures considerably short of licencc ~ermination.'~
Unfairness which occurs where licensee expectations are derived from extra-contractual
information are being addressed through the development of a centralized information and
communication program, staff training, program structures which establish a limited group
of bureaucrats as authoritative sources of contractual information, and by contract terms
which efficiently shift thc risk of conflicting information from the government to the
private contracting party."
Govcmment incentive programs, and in particular the E~ivironmentalChoice Program,
represent potentially effective markct based alternatives to command models of state
action. The procedures employed in implementing those programs, if they are to duplicate
the success of their predecessors in the private sector, should be consistent with market
based ideals
considerable information about the other party's expected behaviour,
recognition of third party effects in the contract, and significant participatory opponunities
in the self-definition of entitlements and as well as in their allocation.
V. THE PROGRAMMATIC BENEFITS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
In Part 11. I argucd that, in theory, the kind of information required to produce effective
public policy demanded substantial and meaningful public participation in program
decision-making processes. In Pan 111, I described the way in which that thesis has been
implemented in the Environmental Choice Program's operations. In this Part, I develop
in more detail thc range of ways in which effective participation by environmental groups,
independent scientists and the relevant industry, has contributed significantly to the ability
of public bureaucrats to further the public policy objectives of the Environmental Choice
Program.
A. ACHIEVING STRATEGIC PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

What should be obvious from what has bcen said so far is tha~offering opportunities
for participation serves several strategic bureaucratic objectives."' Open invitations to

"
'

"
65

A response which will reduce the risk of inncxcnt bureaucrdtic errors, and misinformation. Scc
Cnrotcil of Civil Sc>niw Unions er (11. V. Mitlister for the Civil Smdc.e, 119851 A.C. 374 per Lord
Dipluck at 408 (rrquircment of communication of some "rational ground" for withdrawal of benefit).
However, affording the private sector ex post appeal rights may not meet judicial definitions of
procedural fairness. The Supreme Coun of Canada in Boilrd c!fEduc~ctriotrof rhr Indicln Hcwd School
Di1~i.sio11
No. I9 nf Suske~~chewunv. Knighr. suprci notc 46, held that the statutory right to an

investigation of and an appeal from an employment tcrmination dccision did not displace the
unfairness of un original decision without a hearing. See also, Molloch v. Akrdern Corp.. 119711 2
All E.R. 1278 (H.L.) per Lord Wilkrrorce at 1297.
See A. Schwartz and R.E. Scott, Sulrs Lu~c~utrd
rhe Cnntrctcriri~P~IJC~.Y.V
(Mineda N.Y.: Foundation
Prcss, 1982) at 46-62.
The stratcgic advantages operate both out and down to thc private sector, and inward and up to
Environment Canada and the Minister of thc Environment
1 discuss thc internal strategic
advantages in P M V. I:.
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environmental groups and industry to participate permits the program to identify, at a very
early stage in the development of environmental guidelines, self-proclaimed potentially
affected groups and firms. The participation of these groups facilitates the development
of environmental guidelines which represent unanimous consensus positions at best. and
acceptable compromises at worst.66Early identification also reduces the risk of holdout
strategies by the private sector, whose participation in developing the guidelines, in
applying for licences, and in marketing "ECOLOGOED" products is critical to the success
of the pr~grarn.~'Participatory rights engagc the political support of potential
beneficiaries. and perhaps some potential losers, early on in the decision-making process.
B. IMPROVING BUREAUCRATIC ACCESS TO 1NFORMATlON
Participatory rights recognize that the role of industry and environmental groups on
CSA administered "task forces" is critical to the success of the program. As describcd
above, an important role of each task force is to redefine the boundaries of product
categories, and to develop associated performance and design criteria which comprise the
environmental guideline. Equally important is the ongoing input of task force participants
into the product specitic environmental impact analysis which, while initially prepared
within the program, is constantly improved upon in light of information generated in the
work of the task forces. Finally, industry input is essential to an analysis of the
relationship between the substantive content of the environmental guidelines and sales of
ECOLOGOED products necessary to optimize program environmental benefits taking into
account environmental as well as market variables. Put simply, task force participation
generates substantial benefits to the achievement of program objectives represented by
increased accuracy, currency and comprehensiveness of the information base upon which
program decisions are made.h"
1 explained in Part I1 the reasons why industry participation is necessary to generate
the murket analyses upon which program decisions must be predicated. In addition, there
are several reasons for believing that the environmental impact analyses are likely to
benefit from high levels of participation during the guideline development process. The
assessments, which are prepared by consultants on a contract basis, may be originally
imperfect for several unavoidable reasons. The consultants must work within extremely

"'

"

Consensus decision-making may mean that the environmental guidelines are morc likcly to address
and reduce possible negative externalilies g e n c ~ t e dhy the program. The optimal process would
ensurc that the substantive content of thc guidelines reduce to a minimum the costs associated with
their implementation and maximize net exptrclcd environmenlal hcnctits. While that ideal is
unachievable, open decision-making processes are more likely than closed processes to movc the
program in that dircction.
See Part 11.
Of course, there arc strategic benefits aqsociated with increased accuracy of information. As one
they would prefer not "to defend the industry's position hy
industry representative put it
responding to e m r s or half-truths in our documentation public; better that we get the best input in
the early days from all sources than have both parties embarrassed by poor information."
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limited time constraints." This constraint recognizes that the Board will, in a significant
number of cascs, conclude on the basis of the original assessment that the development
of an environmental guideline is not justified. It is simply impossible to know at the outset
whether certain ideas have sufficient merit to justify additional work. The enormous
diversity of product categories which the Program must address,'" means that the data
and even the methodology employed on an environmental impact assessment on one
category will rarely be transferable to another. This problem is exacerbated by the
apparent absence of' an accepted methodology for producing ''life cycle" environmental
impact analyses of suggested consumer products. Procedural fairness affords bureaucrats
access to scientific as well as market information necessary to develop optimal
environmental guidelines.

C. IMPROVING GUIDELINE DRAFTING
Effective participation furthers the guideline drafting process in several ways.
Participation of a broad range of interests in the guideline development process produces
regulatory language which is less ambiguous than would otherwise be produced. The
reduction in ambiguity is derived from the identification of environmental variables which
might otherwise be left unarticulated. from the explanation of industry specific terms
which have accepted "trade usage" meanings. and from the development of a recorded
negotiating history to which reference can be made at later times. Clarity in guideline
drafting reduces misunderstandings which can lead to inadvertent non-compliance, and the
development of clear directions to industry will reduce monitoring and enforcement costs.

D. LEGITIMATION OF PROGRAM DECISIONS
Participation by affected groups legiiirllatcs the decisions reached by the task forces and
the acceptance of the guidelines as authoritative and
thus the Board. Legitimation
deserving of respect independent of formal enforcement power is derived from effective
participation which transforms the authorship of regulatory decisions. Without
participation, bureaucratic decisions are perceived by industry as a product of a set of
exogenous values imposed by public bureaucrats. With participation, program decisions
become decisions made by the community of interests and parties affected. Industry
participants are more likely to respect their own decisions as compared to their response
to decisions imposed by others. The participatory processes are all designed to generate
the sense of consent to, and ownership in the program decisions necessary for effective
government.

I*

7iI

The program permits the consultants about two months to complete thc cnvironmental impact
assessment. At present the delay hctween an original product cutegory suggestion and licensing
decisions, commonly approaches one year. It is thus imperative that Ihc prcliminary environ~nenlal
impact assessment not contribute to ildditional delays.
To dale. thc program has developed cnvironmental guidrlines for, bilttcrics, rc-rctincd motw oil.
unbleached paper products, elhanol bascd gasolincs. diaper .services, hcat rccovcry vcnlilators, low
solveni wiltcr based paint, recycled plastic products, among others.
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E. REDUCING ENFORCEMENT COSTS

Associated with legitimation is a fifth programmatic benefit a substantial reduction
in monitoring and compliance costs. While one would bc naive to assume that industry
will, without the threat of licence withdrawal, comply with licence and guideline terms,
participation in the guideline and contract development process will reduce the incentive
to violate the contract terms in number of ways." Enforcement costs are reduced through
the reduction in ambiguity in the guidelines derived from the involvement of industry in
their development. Monitoring and compliance costs are further reduced where industry
participants believe that they are complying with requirements which they themselves
proposed, worked on and approved. Enforcement costs are reduced where licensees are
fully aware of the substantive content of the guideline as a result of their involvcmcnt in
developing the guideline criteria. Finally, enforcement costs are reduced as the substantivc
benefits to the licensee increase, presenting increased downside risks if they were to have
the licence revoked for non-compliance.

F. ENHANCING BUREAUCRATIC POWER
Exercising bureaucratic power is. except to the strictest of positivists, much more than
deriving legislative authorization from a constituting document. Rather, exercising
bureaucratic power means generating the political support of a broad range of related
private and governmental interests. In the case of the Environmental Choice Program that
means generating the support of line bureaucrats in Environment Canada. Ministerial staff,
major industry actors and major environmental groups. Creating process rights furthcrs
this internal bureaucratic strategy in several ways. Affording public interest groups and
industry the opportunity to participate at the program level reduces the chances and
opportunity for those parties to demand the attention of line bureaucrats. A record
illustrating effective participation can be employed to persuade Ministerial staff that
complainants have been "treated fairly" in the program, and that the scientific basis for
the Board decision is defensible.12
Many of these points have been discussed in Part 11, where the program benetits of
effective participation in Category 1 decisions were described and analyzed in detail."
They can also be appreciated through a brief examination of the array of individualized

71

''
"

As well, the licensing fees shift the rnarginal costs ol'monitoring and enforcement associated with
a particular licensee to that licensee, rather thin allocating those costs to gcneral administrative or
overhead costs.
The appeal process which would permit an affected party to seek a Board revicw of its
recommendation on an environmental guideline is being devclopad to provide those assurances during
the Ministerial approval process.
One way to understand regulation is to conceivc of it in purely inl'ormitional terms regulation
describes the phenomenon of informing persons of the consequences of their behaviour. The earlicr
in the regulatory process one can generate the information, the sooner one can expect industry to
comply. Early disclosure of government policy through the distribution of environmental impact
assessments, participation on task forces, discltxure of reasons for decisions to tcrminate licences.
and so an influences private sector conduct much earlier in the regulatory process than would
occur if the decisitms were only disclosed once they were final.
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procedural rights afforded potential and currcnt licensees in Category 2 decision-making
all of which, on their face further only the interests of the private industry.
Procedural protection in the original application process reduces the risk that potential
licensees might be precluded from participating in the program without a review of the
environmental benefits associated with their products. As well, the process generates
valuable information which facilitates the development of more effective monitoring and
compliance processes which can be applied to other applicants. And consideration of
applications has generated ideas for related product categories with somewhat different
environmental guidelines where applications have been considered and then temporarily
rejected.
Procedural fairness in the licensing process significantly reduces the risk of contract
litigation by initiating an independent assessment of contract and guideline compliance
prior to final contract termination. This reduction in the risk of substantive contractual
challenges to govemment action is coupled with a reduction in procedural challenges
using administrative law concept^.'^
Most important, procedural protection in the licensing context increases both the private
and social benefits of the program. The private value of the entitlement to the licensee is
increased through a reduction in the risk of govemment action unrelated to compliance.
As the private value of the entitlement is increased, the program can demand greater
environmental benefits in the substantive content of its guidelines. The existence of an
appeal right generates further environmental benefits where it identifies licensees which
ought not to have their entitlemcnt terminated."
Finally, notice and appeal rights may permit the program to negotiate less Drdconian
solutions to non-compliance which permits licences to continue in effect. Enjoying the
ultimate power to de-licence, if that is all one has, presents the regulator with a difficult
and delicate game of "chicken" with members of the regulated industry. As with many
regulatory programs, Environmental Choice Program regulators need licensed
manufacturers as much as the licensee needs the regulators' continued consent to use the
ECOLOGO. Understood in this way, simply giving the regulator the power to terminate
the licence, and no more, is unlikely to generate optimal enforcement decisions. Fairer
termination provisions permit flexible and situation-specific responses to non-compliance
which can simultaneously address non-compliance and continue the production of
environmental benefits through sales of ECOLOGOED products.

74
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I-itigation is not simply undesirahle because we might lose a challcngc to a particular licensing
decision. Much niore important is that litigation re-directs substantial Board and bureaucratic
resources away from program ohjec~ivestowards dealing with the lawsuit. Much more important than
losing is that litigation is vinually thc last thing that a Minister wmts to see in her political future.
Much more important than losing a particular case is that losing will signal dozens of other parties
of a potential weakness in the bureaucratic resolve which can be exploited. Much more imponunt
than losing is that litigation, and the issues addressed in courts, are at best pcwrly understmn~dby
program staff who are effectively disempowered once the threat of litigation is raised.
Of course that benefit must he weighed against the cost of delay, and of "false positives" cases
where termination is justified but the appeal process generates a result in favour of the licensee.

Heinonline - - 31 Alta. L. Rev. 570 1993

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND INCENTIVE PROGRAMS

57 1

This remarkable combination of programmatic benefits associated with procedural
fairness is not, however, the only way to assess the development of the Environmental
Choice Program. In the next Part, 1 briefly explore several possible justifications for
imposing limitations on process rights.

V1. CONSTRAINTS ON FAIRNESS
While procedural fairness furthers program objectives, it does not do so without costs.
Defining the limits of fairness in government incentive programs depends on the original
justifications for creating fairness obligations. Utilitarian justifications suggest that
investments in fairne~s'~
should be made only until h e marginal cost of faimess just
about equals the marginal benefits generated by the development of procedural rights. As
an empirical question, that is likely unverifiable. But the experience of the Environmental
Choice Program suggests that the costs, even with the substantial investments now being
made, are justified. As well, the Board in designing its procedures is cognizant of delay
costs and is developing conditions on participation in an cffon to reduce the risks that
parties can cxploit procedural rights for strategic advantage.77 Finally, a significant
portion of process costs is privatized through the non-subsidization of industry
participation in enhancing the market and scientific information on which the guidelines
are based, and through the partial allocation of program costs, through the fee schedule,
to specific licensees.
Program designers who are cognizant of the costs of procedural fairness can attempt
to maximize the benefits of participation by instituting processes which are linked to the
achievement of program objectives, by privatizing some portion of those costs, and by
defining process rights so as to reduce strategic delay opportunities.
A second constraint on fairness relates to the ability of the program to modify its
structure and decision-making processes on an ongoing basis. What has made the program
as "fair" as it is, has been the Board's willingness to operate without an administrative
manual, and to respond quickly and effectively to events in each stage of the program's
operations. There is a considerable risk that benefits associated with this flexibility will
be compromised if "fairness" is blindly defined as acting as others would cxpect in light
of inferences derived from past behaviour or from explicit representations about future
actions.7*This risk is exacerbated by the multi-sectoral nature of the program which
consists of a diverse Board of Directors, internal program staff seconded from
Environment Canada, Environment Canada bureaucrats, the Minister's staff, thc Canadian

'"
"

''

The investment costs include incurred cxpcnses which would otherwise be employed in othcr aspccts
or thc program. Bourd and staff time and effort, and dclays in generating guidclincs and licensed
products in consumer markets.
For example, the right to a rcview ol' environrncntal guidelines will likcly be limited to a right to
prescnt information which was unavailable at the tinlc the relevant task force developed thc
substantive contcnt of thc guideline. and to present procedural unfairncss arguments. It is not a review
of thc merits of the decision, nor a review of the information on which the decision was hascd.
See Cou~~cil
(!/'CivilService Unions ei nl. v. Mirrisrer,for the Civil Sen,ice, [ 1985) A.C. 374 per Lord
Tullybelton at 401 (Icgitimafe expectations might arise frvm either regular practice or explicit
rcprcsentations).
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Standards Association, temporary task forces comprised of multi-sectoral volunteers, and
a Coordinating Technical Committee comprised of independent scientists. The idea that
this amalgam of personnel and institutions could generate one clear consistent message
over time is likely unattainable.
The final constraint on "fairness" recognizes the contradiction between participatory
rights enjoyed by an abstract public, and the political reality of public administration. The
asymmetric distribution of information among affected parties, the ability of industry to
recapture some of its costs of participation, and the incentive of industry to participate
given the highly focused gains and losscs generated by the program combine to create a
significant risk that industry might "capture" the program through domination of its task
forces and control of its information base.
The solution to this risk is. paradoxically, ,?tore purticipcrrion. Industry, like the
environmental movement, is not homogeneous. In the case of competitive industries, the
Program has attempted to ensure the participation of smaller, enirepreneurial enterprises
who have the incentive and information resources to expose the weaknesses in the data
and arguments of the major industrial participants. Similarly. the Program has attempted
to ensure the participation of the non-industrial sector through the funding of
environmental and consumer organizations. Effective parlicipation in task forccs requires
substantial expertise and the investment of considerable valuable time by volunteers.
Unlike the private sector, the gains from that participation are not cnjoyed privately by
public intcrest groups, and thus one cannot argue, as in the case of industry participants,
that thosc gains ought to be used to fund the intervenor's costs."
VII. CONCLUSION

The Environmental Choice Program, like many governnicnt incentive programs
involves ongoing contractual relations, and is designed to achieve environmental policy
objectives through the allocation of direct benetjts to private sector parties. One
characteristic of those kinds of relations in private markets is a concern with one's
reputation among existing and future partners, and a substantial clement of cooperation
between the participants in market transactions. Government burcaucrats have not
necessarily been concerned with reputation effects and the generation of cooperative
arrangenlents between themselves and the firms whose behaviour they are attempling to
influence.
My thesis is that incentive programs, like the more successful market transactions
which occur in the private sector, will succeed as the government and the private sector

7V

The pmgram has recently developed a policy to fund the travel and accommodation costs of public
inlcrest intervenors, ils well a,thc costs ol' engaging cxpeds to iissist them on task force guideline
development work. The task o f selecting the subset of applicant public intcrest groups has bccn
delegated to a small coordinating group who will recommend the funding of groups which have a
clearly defined interest and subject matter expertise in the product ca~egoryor environtnenral issuc
heing addrcsscd. Wc hive not ycr made the critical "firs1 order" dccision regarding the absolutc or
rclativc amount 01' our program budget which will be ullocated lo that funding program.
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establish cooperative solutions to exploit joint opportunities. With time. these relationships
strengthen, mutual benefits increase, and default risks are reduced as individuals discover,
through experimentation, personal contact, and identification, that cooperative action is
both possible and privately beneficial. Regulatory responses to environmental degradation
using coercion and force. while necessary in certain contexts, cannot be expected to
duplicate the success of long term, mutually beneficial exchange relationships in
transforming human activity.
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APPENDIX A

The following three examples reveal the importance of knowing the relationship
between R, and R, in producing the shape of three intermediate curves where:

L,

=

ECU,, - ECU, + EQU,

EQ

=

R,EC

u,

=

RUU,

L,

=

ECU,, - ECR,,U, + R,ECU,

--

ECU,(l - R,

+ R,R,)

L,( 1 - R,, + R,Ru)
CASE 1

In the case where R, = 1 - (1 - R,)*

L,

=

LC,(1 - (1 - ( 1 - RJ2)

+ Rc(1 - (1 -

For example, where R, = ,5, then L, = .625L,

CASE 2
In the case where, R, = R, = R
L,

=

L,(I - R + R ? )

For example, where R, = .5, then L,, = .75L,,

CASE 3
In the case where R, = Re2

L,

=

L,,(I

- R,' + R,.')

Then where R, = .5, then L, = 3 7 5 L,,.
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